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IN THE. SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
CITY OF BINGHA1f CANYON and
BOYD NERDEN

'
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.

ICENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION, a corporation and BO·Y-LES
BROTHERS DRILLING COl\fp ANY, a corporation,

Defendants and Appellants.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs and respondents in this action are the City
of Bingham Canyon, a municipal corporation, and Boyd
Nerden, its building inspector \vho has the responsibility
of enforcing the zoning ordinance vvhich is the subject
of the litigation belovv. The defendants and appellants
are l{ennecott Copper Corporation, \\'"hich operates a
large open-pit copper rnine extending into the City of
Bingham Canyon, and Boyles Brothers Drilling Con1pany,
which is retained by Kennecott to perform exploratory
core drilling work.
1
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On ~fay 5, 1959, the City of Bingham ·Canyon adopted
the first zoning ordinance in its history. (R.15) That
ordinance purports to divide the City of Bingham into
four areas designated for residential, commercial, industrial and mining uses. (R. 15, Ex. 1) Kennecott
appeared at the zoning hearing and objected to the adoption of the proposed ordinance because it would restrict
then existing operations of its open-pit copper mine,
because the paper zoning lines were arbitrary and bore
no relationship to the historical uses of the property
involved, and the Qrdinance by its terms would deprive
Kennecott of rights guaranteed by the 14th Amendment
of the Constitution of the United States and by Sections
7 and 22 of Article I and Article XI of the Constitution
of the State of lJtah. (R. 7, 28, 45)
Kennecott was particularly concerned about the application of the zoning ordinance to property owned by
it up-stream from Carr Fork Canyon Junction "1'here all
of the property was zoned either "Industrial" or "Mining". The ·Company in the past had been performing
both drilling and mining operations upon its own property
in the area 'vhich is now eovered by paper zoning lines
designated I-1, or "Industrial''.
Such drilling, mining and allied activities constituted
the sole and exclusive use of sueh property. None of the
activities prescribed by the zoning ordinance for an industrial zone (e.g.~ tin s1nelting, ore processing, ore
wholesaling) were being carried on by Kennecott on such
property. (R. 33-35, 45-49)
2
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The zoning ordinance as drafted and then approved
over objection of l(ennecott would, if valid, stop a
substantial portion of the then existing mining operations on l(ennecott's own property, and would prevent
the removal of several millions of tons of ore which, at
that time, had been blocked out in preparation for removal. It also would prevent any future development
of the mine in this area. (R. 45, 49)

l(ennecott at no time recognized the lawfulness of
the purported ordinance but continued its mining operations in the industrial zone. Prior to the adoption
by Bingham Canyon of the ordinance here in question,
ICennecott, through Boyles Brothers Drilling Company,
had con1pleted two exploratory holes (Ko. 174 and No.
179) 'vi thin what now is designated as the Industrial
Zone. (R. 46) In early 1960, l(ennecott, again through
Boyles Brothers Drilling Company, commenced the drilling of a si1nilar hole in the Industrial Zone above Carr
Fork Junction and approximately 350 feet from any
property o'vned by any person other than l(ennecott.
(R.45-46) That drill hole 'vas designated X o. 51, and
it 'vas being drilled as part of a systematic plan of exploration and development. Such exploration and development is a necessary part of the mining process. (R.
23) The drilling of II ole No. 51 did not involve any
combustion, dust, explosions, fumes or oders. (R. 2728) It did not adversely affect the public health, the
'vater, air or sewage supplies, the morals, the safety
or the public 'velfare of any resident of Bingham Canyon
or of any other person. (R. 46) Indeed, the economy
3
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of Bingham Canyon is dependent wholly upon Kennecott's mining operation. It 'vould become a ghost town
if such mining were to cease. ( R. 25-27)
Shortly after the commencement of the drilling of
Hole No. 51, the plaintiffs filed their complaint in the
court below, alleging that the city had adopted the zoning ordinance herein discussed and that the two defendants were violating this ordinance. They prayed for
interlocutory and permanent injunctions restraining the
alleged violation of such zoning regulations by either of
the defendants. (R. 1-3)
Defendants' answer stated, among other things, that
the actions complained of were non-conforming uses and
as such were not prohibited by the zoning ordinance;
and further, that the zoning ordinance, in its application
to Kennecott, was unconstitutional. (R. 5-9)
Following a hearing on order to sho'v cause 'vhy a
temporary injunction should not issue, the court belo"'
filed and entered the order from "yhich this appeal is
taken. This order states in part material here:
"IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the
defendants be restrained from and enjoined from
drilling within the city limits of the ·City of
Bingha1n Canyon during the pendency of this
action.'' ( R.57)
At the hearing, plaintiff Boyd Nerden testified for
plaintiffs and Alvin J. Thuli, Jr., Chief Engineer for
l{ennecott, testified for the defendants. (R. 10-56)
4
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Their testimony (the only evidence adduced) did not
disclose that the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable
injury pending the hearing of this controversy on its
Inerits. There 'vas no evidence that drilling of the exploratory hole involved or the existing mining operations
of the defendant "rould in any way injure the plaintiffs
during the pendency of the action. Indeed, the evidence
of both 'vitnesses was to the contrary. (R. 23-28, 46)

Further, the court's order, although purporting to
grant an interlocutory injunction, was not supported
by findings of fact and conclusions of law as required
by Rule 52 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Finally, the court's order was a great deal broader
than the relief prayed for by plaintiffs in their complaint. The order itself purports to enjoin all "drilling''
within the city limits of Bingham Canyon during the
pendency of this action. As is demonstrated by Exhibit
1, a good deal of the area involved is zoned ~1-I, or "1\fining". The ordinance, even if valid, permits the very
activity which the court here enjoins 'vithin the mining
zone of Bingham Canyon. The Plaintiffs complain only
of mining and drilling activities in the industrial zone.
(R. 1-3)
On July 29, 1960, this court granted the petition of
defendants for an intermediate appeal, and modified the
order of the court belo'v to permit the continuation of
drill II ole No. 51 during its pendency. (R. 59-60)
5
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
I. The interlocutory .injunction issued by the
trial court is void for the reason that it is supported
by neither fin~dings of fact nor conclus:ons of law.
II. The interlocutory injunct:on issued by the
trial court is void for the reason that it is not supported by evidence.
III. The interlocutory injunction issued by the
trial court is void for the reason that it is b.roader in
scope than the prayer of plaintiffs' complaint.

ARGUMENT

I.
POINT
The interlocutory injunction issued by the trial
court is void for the reason that it is supported by
neither fin.dings of fact nor conclusions of law.
The interlocutory injunction, from 'vhich this intermediate appeal has been perfected, ,,~as issued by the
trial court in the absence of any findings of fact or conclusions of la"r· It, therefore, does not meet the requirements of Rule 52 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which reads in part:
"In all actions tried upon the facts without
a jury or ""ith an advi~ory j~ry, the court shall,
unless the same are "~a1ve~, find the facts specially and state separately Its conclusions of law
thereon and direct the entry of the appropriate
6
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judgu1ent; and in granting or refusi'ng interlocutory injunctions the court shall sirnilarly set forth
the f'indings of fact and conclusions of law which
constitute the grounds of its action." (Emphasis
added)
vVithout the requisite findings of fact and conclusions of law, the court's interlocutory injunction is a
nullity. In Fisher v Emerson, 15 Utah 517, 50 Pac. 619,
a case involving an injunction, this court said at page
521:
"The making and filing of findings and conclusions was part of, and must precede the entry
of, the judgn1ent."
'11he effect of the failure of a trial judge to support
his judgment with findings of fact and conclusions of
la'v "ras determined by this court in one of its very early
decisions, (1883). In Reich v. The Rebellion S.~f. ·Co.,
et al, 3 Utah 254, 2 Pac. 703 "the issues were tried by
the court, and without making or filing any findings of
fact and conclusions of law, judgment was rendered for
defendant * * *". In reversing that judgment for the
reason that a judgment cannot stand unless supported by
findings of fact and conclusions of law in the State of
Utah, the court said at page 258:

"Under the 180th Section of the Practice Act,
in trials of issues of fact by the court, \Yri tten
findings of fact and conclusions of la\v, separately
stated, Inust be n1ade and filed before any judgInent can be entered. They are the foundations
for the judg1nent, and are as necessary to precede
7
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any judgment as a verdict in a case of trial .by
jury. Under our statute, there is no presumption
in the absence of findings when issues o~ fact are
tried by the court without a jury. The JUdgme.nt
of the lower court is reversed and a new trial
ordered."
This court has also made clear the fact that this
requirement applies with equal force to actions at law
and to cases in equity. This court stated in In Re
Thompson's Estate, 72 Utah 17, 35, 219 Pac. 103;
"Our statute requires the facts found and the
conclusions of law to be separately stated. Unless
that is done and all the material facts found as
disclosed by the evidence which in the judgment
of the court and counsel have a bearing upon the
question as to what the judgment should be,
nothing more is accomplished than a mere general
verdict and the wholesome purpose of the statute
frustrated requiring findings and conclusions to
be separately found and stated. Such requirement of the statute is just as essential in equity
as in a law case. A judgment rendered on no
findings or not upon suffi·cient or proper findings
to support it, has no more validity £n equity than
in law." (Emphasis added)
The rule initially pro1nulgated by the Legislature,
later applied by the courts, and no'Y incorporated by this
court into its Rule 52 (a) 'vas conceived in wisdon1 and
is extremely useful to the trial court, to the parties and
to the Supre1ne Court jn cases "There factual matters are
determined by the court 'Yithout jury. Being required
expressly to find the facts upon which its conclusion
8
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'"ill rest, and to separately state its legal conclusions
upon which it predicates its judgment, the trial court is
less apt to err and is forced to give more than summary
consideration to evidence and to precedent. The findings
and conclusions serve as guide posts to the parties thenlselves which aid them in determining the legal effect and
consequences of a judgment and in charting the future
course of their affairs. They likewise are of vital importance to a reviewing court to aid and assist it in determining whether the judgment below 'vas properly
entered.

Professor 1foore defines the purpose of the substantially identical federal rule as follows: (Moore's Federal
Practice, Vol. 5 Page 2632)
"The purpose of findings of fact and conclusions of law is to aid the trial court in making
a correct factual decision and a reasoned application of the law to the facts; to define for purpose of res judicata and estoppel by judgment
the issues then adjudicated; and to aid the appellate court."
Federal Courts applying Rule 52 (a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (which is identical 'vith respect
to interlocutory injunctions to the Utah Rule) have given
to findings of fact and conclusions of law the same
i1nportance and consequences as has this court. One of
the land-mark federal cases in this area is ~iayo v. Lakeland Highlands Canning Co. (1940) 309 l-;-. S. 310, 316,
60 S. Ct. 517, 84 L. Ed 77 -l:. That case involved a suit
by citrus fruit dealers to enjoin the State Co1n1nissioner
9
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of Agriculture from cancelling plaintiff's licenses, from
enforcing certain minimum price regulations against the
plaintiffs and from interferring with the conduct of
plaintiffs' businesses. There, the trial court issued a
temporary restraining order. This was followed, after
hearing, by an interlocutory injunction pending the final
disposition of the case on its merits. (See 28 F. Supp.
44) In reversing the trial court and setting aside its
interlocutory injunction, the Supreme Court of the
United States said:
"We think the court committed serious error
in thus dealing with the case upon motion for
temporary injunction. The question 'Yas not
whether the commission. had complied with the
requirements of the act, if valid, but "~as "'"hether
the showing made raised serious questions, under
the Federal Constitution and the State law, and
disclosed that the enforcement of the act, pending
final hearing, would infl£ct irreparable damages
upon the complainants.
"The observations made in the course of the
opinion are not, in .any proper sense, findings of
fact upon these vital issues. Statements of fact
are mingled 'vith argun1ents and interferences
for which 've find no sufficient basis either in the
affidavits or the oral testimony. It is of the htghest importance to a proper revieu~ of the action
of a court in granting or refusing a prelimt1wry
injuncti'on that there should be fair conzpliance
with Rule 52 (a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

'' * * *
''We reverse the decree and remand the cause
to the court below "~ith instructions that if the
motion for interlocutory injunction is ~ressed
the parties if they desire it, 1nay be afforded ~
10
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further hearing, and any action taken by the court
shall be upon findings of fact and conclusions
founded upon the evidence, in accordance with
Rule 52 (a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure."
(Emphasis added)
Thus it is submitted that the interlocutory injunction here in question, unsupported by findings of fact
and conclusions of law is void. One can only guess what
facts, if any, were relied upon by the trial court. One
can only guess concerning the legal reasons, if any, upon
which he eourt's judgn1ent 'vas predicted. It is, therefore, impossible for counsel or for this court to determine
\vhether the facts, if any, in the mind of the trial judge
were properly found from the evidence, or vvhether the
conclusions of law, if any, 'vhich were applied thereto
\vere proper or appropriate.

II.
POINT
The interlocutory injunction issued by th·e trial
court is void for the reason that it is not suppo·rted by
evidence.
This court but infrequently has had before it questions relating to the function and prerequisites of the
interlocutory injunction. However, in the very early case
of Flagstaff Silver-1\Iin. Co. v. Patrick, 2 Utah 30-±, the
court cited vvith confidence and approval Section 4,
, . . ol. 1 of A Treatise on the La'v of Injunctions by James
L. High of the Chicago Bar 'vith respect to both the
11
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nature of and prerequisites for an interlocutory injunction. In Section 4 of that work l\Ir. High, after first
stating that the sole purpose of a preliminary injunction
is to preserve the status quo until the basic issue ul~
timately can be determined on the merits, states:

''And where the granting of an interlocutory
injuncti:on involves the decision of a novel question of latv of grave importance and serious diff~culty the injunction should be denied." (Emphasis added)
Mr. High elucidates further on this subject in Section 8 at pages 12 and 13 as follows :
"The writ of injunction, being largely a preventative remedy, "rill not ordinarily be granted
where the parties are in dispute concerning their
legal right8, until the right is established at la-\v.
And if the right for "\Yhich protection is sought is
dependent upon disputed questions of la'v which
have never been settled by the courts of the state,
and concerning "Thich there is an actual and existing dispute, equity "Till 'vithhold relief until the
questions of la'v have been detern1ined by the
proper courts.''
Hence, the language of nir. High cited "~th approval
by this court clearl~T de1nonstrates that the interlocutory
injunction here involYed "Tns in1properly issued by the
trial court. Here, the underlying and controlling issue
of law is whether the zoning ordinance in question sought
to be enforced by the plaintiffs violates the rights of
the defendants as defined nnd preserved by the 14th
A1nenchnent to the Con~6tution of the United States and

12
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

by Sections 7 and 22, Article I and Article XI of the Constitution of the State of L-:-tah. This is certainly a vital
and important question of law \vhich has not been settled
by the courts of this state and which is in actual and
existing dispute between the parties. Consequently, an
interlocutory injunction should not issue until that controlling question of law, as well as the second question of
non-conforming use have been decided after hearing on
the merits.

Further, as is stated both by l\fr. High in his treatise
and Ly this court in Flagstaff Silver-1\'fin. Co. v. Patrick,
supra, the sole purpose of a preliminary injunction is to
preserve the status quo. Here, the injunction entered by
the trial court does not preserve the status quo. Instead,
it unbalances the status quo in favor of the plaintiffs.
lt orders the defendants to cease vital drilling and mining activities in which they were engaged prior to the
adoption of the zoning ordinance. Indeed, as is shown
in argument under Point III, infra, the order is much
broader than plaintiffs' prayer--the order even prohibits mining in the mining zone! On the other hand, the
plaintiffs failed to produce any evidence which would
indicate damage of any kind which they would sustain if
their application for interlocutory injunction were
denied.
This court has ruled that it is important to consider the relative inconvenience to the parties involved
prior to the granting of an injunction. The equities
should be balanced. In \\Tinters v. Turner, 74 Utah 222,
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78 Pac. 816, Cert. Den. 281 U. S. 692, 74 L.Ed. 1121,
50 S.C. 238, reversing a decree enjoining the defendant
from permitting his cattle to respass upon plaintiff's
land, this court said at pages 237 and 238 of the Utah
Report:

"The comparative convenience or inconvenience of the parties from granting or ,vithholding
an injunction sought should be considered, and
none should be granted if it 'vould operate oppressively or inequitably or contrary to the real
justice of the case."
Plaintiffs failed to produce any evidence upon \vhich
a preliminary injunction could be based, for the testimony of ~ir. Nerden for the plaintiffs and ~fr. Thuli for
the defendant discloses:

a. The effect on Kennecott of the paper zoning lines
and zoning use restrictions \Vas \Yholly \Yithout any· relationship to the public health, morals or the general 'v-elfare of the City of Bingha1n Canyon and of its inhabitants.
b. Neither the use restrictions nor the zoning boundaries had any relationship ''Thatsoever to the use to which
the property-all o"\vned by l{ennecott-"\vas being put
on May 5, 1959.

c. Enforce1nent of the ordinance could and ,,. . ould
confer no benefits on other residents or on the 0 ,vners
of surface land rights or structures "Tithin the city lilnits ~

14
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but the curtailment of the defendant's mining program
would adversely affect Bingham's residents, businesses
and the owners of surface rights.
d. Enforcement of the zoning limitations would prevent Kennecott from removing millions of tons of ore
blocked out and scheduled for ultimate removal.

,,
,,,.

··-

.. ,
1

11

It is respectfully submitted that on the basis of such
evidence, a preliminary injunction cannot properly issue.
The United States Supreme ·Court in Mayo v. Lakeland
I-Iighlands Canning ·Co., Supra, states that the test
governing the issuance of a preliminary injunction is
whether the act complained of "pending final hearing,
would inflict irreparable damages upon the complainants''. (Emphasis added)
High's Treatise on the Law of Injunctions, 4th
Edition, Vol. 1, Section 10, reads in part:
"Interlocutory injunctions being often sought
for the purpose of harassing and annoying defendants, the utmost care should be observed in
the exercise of the jurisdiction, and the relief
should only be allowed upon a clear necessity
being shown of affording inzmediate protection
to some right or interest of the party comp!aining which would other'lvise be seriously injured
or ~mpared and 'vhere the plaintiff will suffer no
immediate injury from the acts complained of an(l
the injury, if any, is of such a nature that it can
be easily remedied upon final hearing, a preliminary injunction is properly denied." (Emphasis
added)

15
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l\1:r. High continues in Section 22 as follows:
"An interlocutory injunction 'viii not be allowed where the right ,vhich plaintiff seeks to
have protected is in doubt or where the tt·nJ.tttry
U'hich U'ill resuJt fro?n the invasion of the rttght
is not irreparable." (Emphasis added)
Mr. Pomeroy in his Equity Jurisprudence, Fourth
Edition, Vol. 4, Section 1685 (Equitable Remedies, Section Edition, Section 264) states as follows in a similar
ve1n:
"Preliminary or interlocutory injunctions are
granted to preserve the property in status quo
pending the determination of the suit. The right
to such relief depends upon a showing of irreparable injury, and rests 'vithin the sound discretion of the court.'' (Emphasis added)
See 28 Am. Jur. 502, Section 14 for a similar statement of the prerequisites for issuance of a preliminary
or interlocutory injunction.

Village of Lloyd Harbor v. Huntington, 143 N.Y.
Supp. 2d 797 (1955) is a case on all fours 'vith the case
at bar. There, t"'-ro incorporated villages sought to restrain a to,vn from building a public beach on property
purchased by it for that purpose "~ithin such villages
in areas zoned by the villages for residential use only.
The villages clai1ned that a state statute authorizing the
towns to acquire lands and establish public breaches
within. the jurisdiction of villages "~as unconstitutional.

16
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The town in defense maintained that the application of
the zoning regulations of the villages was unconsti tutional as applied to the acts in question of the town.

The villages contended that ''The establishment of
such beaches would completely change the character of
the neighborhood which is peculiarly suitable for single
family residences such as have already been constructed
in that area with resultant congestion in traffic, requiring an increase in police supervision and would materially decrease the market value and consequently the
taxable value of adjacent property and be a blight on
the villages."

The court there viewed the device of the interlocutory injunction in its proper light and refused to issue
the same prior to the hearing of the matter on the merits.
In so doing, it stated in part:
"It is evident, from the nature of the action,
that the relief that the plaintiffs seek by way of
a temporary injunction is the same 'vhich may
be ultimately obtained after trial. Such motions
are granted with great caution and only when
necessity requires. (Citing cases). The court is of
the opinion that the necessity for the drastic relief herein sought has not been demonstrated
factually. In any event, the balance of convenience is with the defendant 'vhieh is attempt1ng
to provide a recreational project for the public.
''Should it be ultimately determined that it
is unconstitutional for the town to provide these
beaches, it is difficult to see 'vhat real harn1 could
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be done to the villages and their inhabitants who
are the inhabitants of the to,vn of Huntington.
Indeed the filling in of swampy sections and t~1e
leveling of others to provide these beaches WI_ll
be of general benefit even if their use as public
beaches n1ay ultimately be prohibited.
"The court is of the opinion that the plaintiffs have not made the necessary showing that
immediate establishment of the beaches will be
destructive of their rights or cause actual material and irreparable injury as distinguished from
fanciful, theoretical or merely possible injury.
(Citing cases)"
Likewise, in our present case, the remedy sought
and obtained by plaintiffs below by way of temporary
injunction is the same which they hope ultimately to
obtain after trial. Here also, the plaintiffs have failed
to demonstrate any factual basis to justify the "drastic
relief" granted by the court belo,v. Here, too, the balance of convenience is 'vith the defendants. They were
here attempting to continue to n1ine valuable ore deposits and, through the con1pletion of drill Hole X o. 51,
to obtain data and inforn1ation "rhich "~ould be beneficial
to the City of Binghan1, and effectuate the declared
public policy of the State of Utah to encourage, not
prevent, mining. Highland Boy !fining Company v.
Strickley, 28 lT. 215, 78 Pac. 296.

Plaintiffs failed to produce a scintilla of evidence
indicating that the acts of defendants 'vhich ,vere enjoined below would in any 'vay prejudice, or injure
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the plaintiffs at all, let alone irreparably. Any possible
injury to the City involved in such acts by defendants
'vas indeed "fanciful, theoretical or merely possible."
There was no showing of any ''material and irreparable
injury." Consequently, the interlocutory injunction was
improperly issued.

III.

POINT
The interlocutory injunction issued by the trial
court is void for the reaso.n that it is broader in scope
than the prayer of plaintiffs' complaint.
The plaintiffs in their complaint, (R. 1-3) complain
only that defendants have engaged in drilling and mining within areas in the City of Bingham Canyon zoned
for industrial use. There is nothing in the complaint
charging or in the evidence indicating that the defendants are not entitled to drill and mine 'vithin the city
limits in those areas specifically zoned for mining purposes.
However, despite the total absence of such claims or
evidence, the trial court ordered in broad and 3Weeping
terms that "the defendant be restricted and enjoined
fran~ drilling within the city lin~its of the City of Binghan~ Canyon during the pendency of this action.'' Thus
the court ordered defendants not to 1nine in areas specifically set aside for that purpose by the plaintiffs!
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CONCLUSION
It seems thus clear that the order of the trial court
filed on July 19, 1960 (R. 57) stands wholly \vithout
support. It is not based upon the necessary findings of
fact and conclusions of law. It is not supported by the
necessary evidence. It is not supported by legal or
equitable precedent. It is not supported by reason. Indeed, it is not even supported by the claims of the
plaintiffs themselves.

The order as wholly arbitrary and capricious should
therefore be vacated.
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